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MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP: A CASE STUDY BROUGHT TO YOU BY THE U.S.
SUPREME COURT
Pat-a-cake, pat-a-cake, baker's man.
Bake me a cake as fast as you can.
Pat it, and prick it, and mark it with "B"
And put it in the oven for Baby and me!1
EDWARD J. SCHOEN

I. INTRODUCTION
In Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission,2 the U.S. Supreme
Court ruled seven to two that the Colorado Civil Rights Commission (“the Commission”) violated
the free exercise rights of a baker, who refused to sell a custom-designed wedding cake to a gay
couple, by reflecting hostility toward the baker’s religious beliefs during public hearings in the
case and treating him differently from three other bakers who objected to creating wedding cakes
with messages expressing derogatory views of same-sex marriage.3 In reaching its decision, the
Court sidestepped the chore of reconciling two fundamental principles: (1) whether the baker’s
refusal to create a wedding cake for a same-sex marriage reception was protected by his First
Amendment rights to free exercise of religion and against compelled speech, and (2) whether
Colorado has authority to protect the rights and dignity of gay people who seek to purchase goods
and services for their wedding through its anti-discrimination statute.4 Instead, the Court ruled the
Commission violated its obligation to consider the baker’s sincere religious objections with “the
requisite religious neutrality that must be strictly observed.”5 In doing so, the Court acknowledged
it postponed the reconciliation of the protections of free exercise of speech and religion and the
protection against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation to future cases, which “must be
resolved with tolerance, without undue disrespect to sincere religious beliefs, and without
subjecting gay persons to indignities when they seek goods and services in an open market.”6
Pat-a-cake, pat-a-cake, baker’s man, WIKIPEDIA (Dec. 20, 2018), https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pat-a-cake,_pat-acake,_baker%27s_man. .
 J.D., Professor of Management, Rohrer College of Business, Rowan University, Glassboro, New Jersey 08028.
2
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
3
Id. at 1729-32. The facts of the Masterpiece Cakeshop case are examined in Part II. Justice Kennedy wrote the
majority opinion in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer, Alito, Kagan and Gorsuch joined. Justice
Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in which Justice Gorsuch joined. Justice
Kagan filed a concurring opinion in which Justice Breyer joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion in
which Justice Alito joined. Justice Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Sotomayor joined.
4
Debra Cassens Weiss, Supreme Court Cites Agency Hostility in Ruling for Christian Baker, ABA JOURNAL (June
4, 2018), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/supreme_court_rules_for_christian_ baker_who_refused_cake_
for_gay_wedding_ci/?utm_source=maestro&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=weekly_email.
5
Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1731. Weiss, supra note 4.
6
Id. at 1732. Another reported case dealing with a wedding vendor who refused to sell a wedding cake to a samesex couple is In the matter of: Melissa Elaine Klein, dba Sweetcakes by Melissa, Case Nos. 44-14 & 45-14 (Oregon
1

The Masterpiece Cakeshop decision decidedly failed to live up to its advanced billing.
Erwin Chemerinsky, Dean of University of California at Berkeley School of Law, had hailed the
case as a “blockbuster” involving a “profoundly significant” issues: whether a business has a
“constitutional right to discriminate based on its owner’s beliefs” or whether the government’s
interest in eradicating sexual-orientation discrimination is more important than the business’s
freedom to choose its customers.7 The Cato Institute declared Masterpiece Cakeshop to be “an
irresistibly compelling case because it appears to present a stark conflict between rights: the right
to be free from discrimination, on the one hand, and the rights of free speech and the free exercise
of religion, on the other.”8 The American Bar Association’s Preview of United States Supreme
Court Cases summed up the importance of the case as follows:
This is one of the most closely watched cases on the Court’s docket this term.
That’s because it deals with a critical and controversial follow-up issue to the
Court’s ruling in Obergefell: If same-sex couples have a right to marry (as they do),
then do they also have a right to anti-discrimination protection under state and local
laws, as against a wedding-cake artist’s rights to free speech and free association?9
An article in the ABA Journal described Masterpiece Cakeshop as “one of the most debated
and anticipated of the term, in no small part because it involves the law of cake and whether cake
speaks” and because it is “at the forefront of a debate about whether creative professionals,”
including bakers, florists, caterers and photographers, “must provide their services for same-sex
weddings when they have religious objections” to same-sex marriage.10
Bureau of Labor and Industries) (Order dated July 2, 2015), accessed on July 16, 2018 at
https://www.oregon.gov/boli/SiteAssets/pages/press/Sweet%20Cakes%20FO.pdf, in which: (n.b. this link works)
Sweetcakes by Melissa, an Oregon bakery, refused to make a wedding cake for a same-sex couple based on
the owners' religious convictions about marriage. The couple filed a complaint with the Oregon Bureau of
Labor and Industries, and the ALJ determined the bakery's refusal to make a wedding cake for the couple
constituted discrimination based on their sexual orientation, which is prohibited by Oregon's public
accommodation law. The ALJ ordered Sweetcakes by Melissa to pay $135,000 in damages to the couple for
emotional and mental suffering resulting from the denial of service. The bakery's owners are challenging the
Oregon Bureau of Labor's decision in the Oregon Court of Appeals as a violation of their freedom of religion,
arguing the First Amendment's protection of religious liberty prohibits such a ruling. Specifically, on appeal,
the owners argue the decision violates their rights as artists to free speech, their rights to religious freedom,
and their due process rights. It is worth noting, however, that Sweetcakes by Melissa recently closed the
bakery.
L. Darnell Weeden, Marriage Equality Laws Are a Threat to Religious Liberty, 41 S. ILL. U. L.J. 211, 218-20
(2017).
7
Erwin Chemerinsky, Is There a Constitutional Right for a Business to Not Serve Customers?, ABA J. (Nov. 30,
2017),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/is_there_a_constitutional_right_for_a_business_to_not_serve_customers/.
8
Christopher Landau & Sopan Joshi, Looking Ahead: October Term 2017, 2017 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 253 (2017).
9
Steven D. Schwinn, Can a State Apply Its Anti-discrimination Law to a Wedding Cake Artist Who Refuses to Make
a Wedding Cake for a Same-Sex Couple Because of His Religious Objections to Same-Sex Marriage?, 45 ABA
PREVIEW 95 (2017).
10
Mark Walsh, Speech, Religion and Bias All Weighed in Masterpiece Cakeshop Case, ABA J. (Nov. 2017),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/speech_religion_bias_masterpiece_cakeshop/P1. See also Deborah A.
Widiss, Intimate Liberties and Antidiscrimination Law, 97 B.U. L. REV. 2083 (2017) (anticipating what the potential
decision in Masterpiece Cakeshop may have on constitutional law concerning intimate liberties).

Greeted as a blockbuster, Masterpiece Cakeshop emerged as a dud in which neither party
clearly prevailed. While the Court ruled in favor of Phillips, it did so on more constricted grounds
than he sought. The court ruled against the Commission, but hinted that future cases must be
resolved with tolerance and without subjecting gay persons to indignities.11 Perhaps the best
explanation for the Court’s narrow decision in Masterpiece Cakeshop appears in an editorial
authored by Christine Emba for The Washington Post:
Here’s the complexity: The United States prides itself on its pluralism. And
in a pluralistic society, differing beliefs in private inevitably lead to clashes of
action in public, as in the Masterpiece case. Someone will have to decide which
actions are allowed, and thus whose rights take priority in public. Someone will
have to choose whether we value more that the baker be able to practice his religion
freely or that a same-sex couple be free from one particular form of discrimination.
But how to decide? That is what the court clearly did not want to do in this
instance — and wisely so. When judicial review gets ahead of public consensus, it
can leave the questions at hand more unsettled, not less. Instead, these decisions
are ones that we, as citizens, will need to carefully take up.
The problem is that we aren’t ready to. What we are missing is an
overarching idea of the common good, one that all citizens have bought into and
can share. Because the only way to decide which of two competing rights wins out
is to decide which best points us toward the larger good we want to achieve, and
prioritize that.12
Nonetheless Masterpiece Cakeshop provides an excellent opportunity to analyze
fundamental and clashing principles underlying the case: whether Phillips’ creation of custom
designed wedding cakes is a form of protected speech, whether requiring Phillips to sell wedding
cakes to same-sex couples violates his right not to engage in compelled speech, whether Phillips
can refuse to create a wedding cake for a same-sex couple as an exercise of religion, and whether
denying same-sex couples the right to purchase goods and services for their wedding can be
constitutionally prohibited under state anti-discrimination laws.
II. MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP STATEMENT OF FACTS
Jack Phillips, an expert baker, owned and operated a bakery called Masterpiece Cakeshop
in Lakewood, Colorado for 24 years. He offered a variety of baked goods, including cookies,
brownies, and elaborate custom-designed cakes for birthday, anniversary and wedding
celebrations. Phillips is a devout Christian whose “main goal in life is to be obedient to” Jesus
Christ and Christ’s “teaching in all aspects of his life.”13 Phillips “seeks to honor God through his
work at Masterpiece Cakeshop,” and firmly believes that “God’s intention for marriage from the
beginning of history is that it is and should be the union of one-man and one-woman” and that
11

Christine Emba, Supreme Court Wasn't Ready to Decide on the Wedding Cake; Neither Are We, PHILA. INQUIRER,
June 11, 2018, at p. A10, http://www.philly.com/philly/opinion/commentary/supreme-court-masterpiece-cakeshopgay-marriage-lgbt-opinion-20180611.html.
12
Id.
13
Id. at 1724.

“creating a wedding cake for a same-sex wedding would be the equivalent to participating in a
celebration that is contrary to his own deeply held beliefs.”14
In the summer of 2012, Charlie Craig and Dave Mullins entered Masterpiece Cakeshop
and told Phillips they were interested in ordering a cake for their upcoming wedding in
Massachusetts and ensuing reception in Colorado. They did not mention the design of the wedding
cake they envisioned. Phillips told Craig and Mullins that he does not “create” wedding cakes for
same-sex weddings, and offered to make them birthday cakes, shower cakes, cookies and
brownies. Craig and Mullins then left the shop without any further discussion. The following day,
Craig’s mother, who had been present in the bakery and witnessed Craig and Mullins’ interaction
with Phillips, telephoned Phillips and asked why he declined to serve her son. Phillips replied that
he does not create wedding cakes for same-sex weddings because of his religious opposition to
same-sex marriage and because Colorado did not recognize same-sex weddings. He further
explained that his creating a wedding cake for a same-sex wedding celebrates an event that goes
directly against the teachings of the Bible, and his doing so would be viewed as his personal
endorsement of that relationship.15
At that time Colorado did not recognize same-sex marriages; however, the Colorado AntiDiscrimination Act (CADA), pursuant to amendments enacted in 2007 and 2008, prohibited
discrimination in places of public accommodation - broadly defined as “any place of business
engaged in sales to the public”16 - on the basis of sexual orientation.17 In September 2012, Craig
and Mullins filed a discrimination complaint against Masterpiece Cakeshop and Phillips in the
Colorado Civil Rights Division (“the Division”). In their complaint, Craig and Mullins alleged
that they were denied “full and equal service” at the bakery and that Phillips “standing business
practice” was not to provide cakes for same-sex weddings.18 The Division opened an
investigation, and the investigator assigned to the complaint determined that, because of his
religious beliefs, Phillips declined to sell custom wedding cakes to Craig and Mullins and about
six other same-sex couples. The investigator found probable cause that Phillips violated CADA
and referred the case to the Commission.19
The Commission determined that a formal hearing should be conducted, and forwarded the
case to a state administrative law judge (“the ALJ”). On cross motions for summary judgment,
the ALJ determined no disputes of material fact existed, decided Phillips’ actions constituted
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, and ruled in favor of Craig and Mullins. Phillips
argued that CADA’s compelling him to create a cake celebrating a same-sex marriage violated his
First Amendment right not to express a message with which he disagreed and his First Amendment
right to free exercise of religion. The ALJ rejected the compelled speech argument on the grounds
preparing a cake was not protected speech and making Phillips create a cake for a same-sex
wedding did not force him to adhere to an ideological point of view. The ALJ rejected the free

14

Id.
Id.
16
Id. at 1725 (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 24–34–601(1) (2017)).
17
Id. at 1725 (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 24–34–601(2)(a) (2017)). The Court quoted the following language from
CADA: “It is a discriminatory practice and unlawful for a person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from, or
deny to an individual or a group, because of disability, race, creed, color, sex, sexual orientation, marital status,
national origin, or ancestry, the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations of a place of public accommodation.”
18
Id.
19
Id. at 1726.
15

exercise of religion argument because CADA was a “valid and neutral law of general applicability”
and applying it to Phillips did not violate the Free Exercise Clause.20
The Commission fully affirmed the ALJ’s decision, and ordered Phillips to “cease and
desist” his refusal to sell wedding cakes to same sex-couples, institute staff training on CADA’s
public accommodations requirements, and prepare quarterly compliance reports for two years
documenting the number of customers denied service, the reasons for the denial of service, and a
description of the remedial actions taken.21
Phillips appealed to the Colorado Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
Commission’s decision and order, and rejected Phillips’ constitutional arguments. The Court of
Appeals determined that selling a wedding cake to a same-sex couple did not “convey a celebratory
message about same-sex marriage” and that compelling Phillips to comply with a valid and neutral
law of general applicability does not constitute interference with the free exercise of religion.22
The Colorado Supreme Court declined to hear the case, and Phillips appealed to the U.S. Supreme
Court which, as noted above, ruled the Commission violated the free exercise rights of Phillips,
because it failed to consider Phillips’s sincere religious objections with requisite neutrality. 23
III. HOW DID THE U.S. SUPREME COURT SIDESTEP THE ISSUES?
The U.S. Supreme Court assessed the challenge it faced in resolving the issues presented
by Masterpiece Cakeshop early in its decision:
The case presents difficult questions as to the proper reconciliation of at least two
principles. The first is the authority of a State and its governmental entities to
protect the rights and dignity of gay persons who are, or wish to be, married but
who face discrimination when they seek goods or services. The second is the right
of all persons to exercise fundamental freedoms under the First Amendment, as
applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.24
Having made this preliminary assessment, the Court then quickly established a two-paragraph exit
strategy to avoid deciding those “difficult questions”:
One of the difficulties in this case is that the parties disagree as to the extent
of the baker's refusal to provide service. If a baker refused to design a special cake
with words or images celebrating the marriage—for instance, a cake showing words
with religious meaning—that might be different from a refusal to sell any cake at
all. In defining whether a baker's creation can be protected, these details might
make a difference.
The same difficulties arise in determining whether a baker has a valid free
exercise claim. A baker's refusal to attend the wedding to ensure that the cake is
cut the right way, or a refusal to put certain religious words or decorations on the
cake, or even a refusal to sell a cake that has been baked for the public generally
20

Id.
Id.
22
Id. at 1727.
23
Id. at 1732.
24
Id. at 1723.
21

but includes certain religious words or symbols on it are just three examples of
possibilities that seem all but endless.25
The Court’s claim that it was difficult to identify the exact service Phillips failed to provide
or the precise religious exercise impeded is misplaced, as Justice Thomas points out in his
concurring opinion discussed more fully below. Phillips told Craig and Mullins he would not
create a wedding cake for a same sex marriage, and told Craig’s mother that he did not create
wedding cakes for same-sex weddings because doing so was contrary to his religious beliefs.
Hence, by fretting about the exact service Phillips declined to provide or the precise religious
exercise Phillips was denied, the Court creates a smoke screen to hide the undisputed fact Phillips
refused to create and sell a wedding cake to a same-sex couple.
Having obfuscated Phillips’ refusal to create the wedding cake for a same-sex couple, the
Court then switches gears and decides the Commission failed to consider the case with “religious
neutrality.”26 The Court gleaned this hostility from comments the commissioners made during the
Commission’s formal, public hearings on May 30, 2014, and July 25, 2014. During the former
hearing, commissioners “endorsed the view that religious beliefs cannot legitimately be carried
into the public sphere or commercial domain, implying that religious beliefs and persons are less
than fully welcome in Colorado's business community”; and one commissioner suggested that
Phillips can believe what he chooses, but cannot act on those religious beliefs if he want to do
business in Colorado and that a businessman who wants to do business in the state but has an issue
with the law’s impact on his religious beliefs better be able to compromise.27 During the former
meeting, another commissioner stated:
I would also like to reiterate what we said in the hearing or the last meeting.
Freedom of religion and religion has [sic] been used to justify all kinds of
discrimination throughout history, whether it be slavery, whether it be the
holocaust, whether it be—I mean, we—we can list hundreds of situations where
freedom of religion has been used to justify discrimination. And to me it is one of
the most despicable pieces of rhetoric that people can use to—to use their religion
to hurt others.28
The commissioner then continued his line of thought by comparing Phillips’ invocation of his
religious beliefs to defenses of slavery and the Holocaust.
Noting that none of the Commissioners objected to these comments during the hearings,
that the state court ruling affirming the commissioners’ did not mention the comments, and that
the commissioners failed to disavow the comments in briefs submitted to the Court, the Court said
it “cannot avoid the conclusion that these statements cast doubt on the fairness and impartiality of
the Commission's adjudication of Phillips’ case.”29
The Court buttressed this conclusion by examining three other decisions of the Division
dealing with bakers who refused to create cakes which intermingled disparaging comments about
same-sex marriage with quotations from religious text.30 The customer requesting the cakes,
25

Id.
Id. at 1723.
27
Id. at 1729.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
A description of the cakes Jack ordered appears in Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion as follows:
26

William Jack, filed a complaint with the Division in which he alleged that the cakes he ordered
reflected his religious beliefs and that the bakers refused to make the cakes because they disagreed
with his religious beliefs.31 In all three cases, the Civil Rights Commission ruled in favor of the
bakers and against the customer, because the requested cakes contained language and images
which the bakers found to be derogatory and because the bakers offered to sell other products to
the customer. In contrast, the Court noted, the Commission ruled against Phillips at least in part
because the message conveyed on the cake would be attributed to the customer rather than Phillips,
and, in reaching this decision, dismissed Phillips’ offer to sell birthday and shower cakes and
cookies and brownies to gay and lesbian customers as irrelevant.32 Hence, the Court concluded,
“the Commission's consideration of Phillips' religious objection did not accord with its treatment
of [William Jack’s] objections.”33
The Court noted that Phillips pressed the Commission’s disparate treatment of his religious
beliefs before the Colorado Court of Appeals and that the Court of Appeals addressed this issue
“only in passing” in a footnote as follows:
This case is distinguishable from the Colorado Civil Rights Division’s recent
findings that [other bakeries] in Denver did not discriminate against a Christian
patron on the basis of his creed when they refused to create the requested cakes.
(Citation omitted.). In those cases . . . there was no impermissible discrimination
because the Division found that the bakeries . . . refuse[d] the patron's request . . .
because of the offensive nature of the requested message.34
This “footnote does not,” the Court emphasized, “answer the baker's concern that the
State's practice was to disfavor the religious basis of his objection,” because the difference in
treatment of Phillips’ and Jack’s complaints “cannot be based on the government’s own assessment
of offensiveness. Just as ‘no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion.’ ”35 Hence the Court concluded, by failing “to
proceed in a manner neutral toward and tolerant of Phillips’ religious beliefs,” “the Commission's
treatment of Phillips’ case violated the State's duty under the First Amendment not to base laws or
regulations on hostility to a religion or religious viewpoint.”36
William Jack visited three Colorado bakeries. His visits followed a similar pattern. He requested two cakes
“made to resemble an open Bible. He also requested that each cake be decorated with Biblical verses. [He]
requested that one of the cakes include an image of two groomsmen, holding hands, with a red ‘X’ over the
image. On one cake, he requested [on] one side[,] ... ‘God hates sin. Psalm 45:7’ and on the opposite side of
the cake ‘Homosexuality is a detestable sin. Leviticus 18:2.’ On the second cake, [the one] with the image
of the two groomsmen covered by a red ‘X’ [Jack] requested [these words]: ‘God loves sinners' and on the
other side ‘While we were yet sinners Christ died for us. Romans 5:8.’
Id. at 1749.
31
Id. at 1735. This information appears in Justice Gorsuch’s concurring opinion.
32
Id. at 1730.
33
Id.
34
Id. at 1730-31.
35
Id. at 1731 (citing West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 62 (1943)).
36
Id. Dean Erwin Chemerinsky disagrees the statements cited by the Court are sufficient to demonstrate hostility to
Phillips’ religious viewpoint. He noted that none of the statements quoted by the Court involved “bakers who were
violating the Colorado statute by discriminating based on race, religion, sex or sexual orientation.” He continued:
“It is ironic that these mild statements were taken as establishing religious discrimination and President Trump’s

IV. OTHER WEDDING VENDOR DISCRIMINATION CASES: FLOWERS, PHOTOGRAPHY AND
RECEPTION VENUE
In addition to Masterpiece Cakeshop, there are a handful of cases dealing with same-sex
couples’ claims of discrimination against various wedding vendors who refused to make floral
arrangements for, or photograph or cater the wedding ceremony and reception.37 In State of
Washington v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., Baronelle Stutzman, the owner of Arlene’s Flowers, who
for years sold flowers to Robert Ingersoll and Curt Freed, a gay couple, refused to sell them flowers
for their marriage on the grounds creating an arrangement of flowers for a same-sex marriage was
contrary to her religious beliefs.38 The Attorney General’s Office filed an action on behalf of
same-sex couple in Benton County Superior Court, which entered judgment for the same-sex
couple and awarded permanent injunctive relief and money damages to Ingersoll and Freed.39 On
direct appeal, the Washington Supreme Court decided (1) Stutzman’s refusal to sell flowers to a
same-sex couple for their wedding ceremony and celebration constituted discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation contrary to the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD)40;
(2) WLAD does not violate First Amendment speech protections, because the sale of floral
arrangements is not expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment41; and (3) WLAD did
not violate Stutzman’s right to religious exercise provided by the Washington Constitution42 and
by the First Amendment.43 The Court concluded:
repeated calls of a Muslim ban did not.” Erwin Chemerinsky, Conservatives’ victories in key cases are a harbinger
of what is to come, ABA J. (July 2, 2018),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/chemerinsky_a_harbinger_of_what_is_to_come/?utm_source=maestro&ut
m_medium=email&utm_campaign=weekly_email.
37
Helpful and insightful discussion of these cases can be found in following law review articles: Angela C.
Carmella, When Businesses Refuse to Serve for Religious Reasons, 69 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 1593, 1608-12 (2017)
and Curtis Schube, SOGI Laws, Their Threat to Religious Liberty, and How to Combat their Trend, 64 DRAKE L.
REV. 883, 893-901 (2016). See also Ayesha Khan, The Butcher, the Baker, the Candlestick Maker: When NonDiscrimination Principles Collide with Religious Freedom, 50 Aug. Md. B.J. 42 (2017) and Douglas Laycock, The
Wedding Vendor Cases, 41 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 49 (2018).
38
State of Washington v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543 (Wash. 2017), petition for cert. filed, 86 U.S.L.W.
3047 (U.S. Jul. 14, 2017) (No. 17-108), vacating judgment, 2018 W.L. 3096308 (June 25, 2018).
39
Id. at 548-51. Notably these wedding vendor cases are not isolated examples of businesses refusing to provide
services because of the storeowner’s disagreement with the view of customers. Professors Stephanie Barclay and
Mark Rienzi report:
After the recent neo-Nazi demonstrations in Charlottesville, a swarm of businesses reacted by refusing to
continue providing services to white supremacist organizations. A salon refused to continue styling the hair
of a politician who would not take a position supportive of LGBT rights. A gay coffee shop owner recently
refused to serve a group of pro-life activists, ejecting them from his store. . . . If one thinks that any of these
businesses are justified in denying their services to individuals, groups, or events to which they object, then
one must acknowledge that the government does not have an unassailable interest in coercing the provision
of any product or service that is already offered to the public.”
Stephanie H. Barclay & Mark L. Rienzi, Constitutional Anomalies or As Applied Challenges? A Defense of
Religious Exemptions, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1595, 1629-30 (2018).
40
Id. at 551-53.
41
Id. at 556-60.
42
Id. at 562-65.
43
Id. at 566-67.

The State of Washington bars discrimination in public accommodations on the basis
of sexual orientation. Discrimination based on same-sex marriage constitutes
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. We therefore hold that the
conduct for which Stutzman was cited and fined in this case - refusing her
commercially marketed wedding floral services to Ingersoll and Freed because
theirs would be a same-sex wedding - constitutes sexual orientation discrimination
under the WLAD. We also hold that the WLAD may be enforced against Stutzman
because it does not infringe any constitutional protection. As applied in this case,
the WLAD does not compel speech or association. And assuming that it
substantially burdens Stutzman's religious free exercise, the WLAD does not
violate her right to religious free exercise under either the First Amendment or
article I, section 11 because it is a neutral, generally applicable law that serves our
state government's compelling interest in eradicating discrimination in public
accommodations.44
In Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, Vanessa Willock e-mailed Elane Photography,
LLC to request that it photograph her commitment ceremony to another woman. Elaine Huguenin,
Elan Photography’s co-owner and lead photographer, responded to Willock and told her that she
photographs “traditional weddings” but not same-sex weddings. Seeking to verify Elane
Photography’s policy, Willock’s partner, Misti Collinsworth, e-mailed Elane Photography and
asked if it would photograph a wedding without mentioning the sex of the couple. Huguenin sent
Collinsworth a list of prices and invited to meet with her discuss her services. Willock filed a
discrimination complaint based on her sexual orientation against Elane Photography with the New
Mexico Human Rights Commission. The Commission decided Elane Photography discriminated
against Willock in violation of the New Mexico Human Rights Act (NMHRA), which prohibits
public accommodations from discriminating against people based on their sexual orientation.
Elane Photography appealed to the Second Judicial District Court for a trial de novo. On cross
motions for summary judgment, the district court granted summary judgment for Willock. Elane
Photography appealed that decision to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the district court’s
decision. The New Mexico Supreme Court granted certiorari.45
Elane Photography argued that its refusal to photograph Willock’s commitment ceremony
did not violate NMHRA, because the photographs it was asked to take captured the celebration of
an event which was contrary to Huguenin religious beliefs and which she did not want to endorse.
Elane Photography claimed it would have taken portrait photographs of same-sex customers, but
not photographs of the couple holding hands or showing affection for each other, even if “the
ceremony was part of a movie and the actors playing the same-sex couple were heterosexual.”46
The New Mexico Supreme Court rejected this argument. It noted that NMHRA broadly prohibits
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation “by any person in any public accommodation”
and that Elane Photography’s provides wedding photography services to heterosexual couples but
refuses to provide those services to homosexual couples under equivalent circumstances. The
Court found that Elane Photography’s argument wrongfully attempts to make a distinction
between an individual’s status of being homosexual and his or her conduct in openly committing
to a same-sex person. The Court stated, “when a law prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual
44

Id. at 568.
Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 58-60 (N.M. 2013).
46
Id. at 61.
45

orientation, that law similarly protects conduct that is inextricably tied to sexual orientation,” and
“there was no basis” to distinguish discrimination based on sexual discrimination from
discrimination based on someone’s public commitment to a person of the same sex. Hence, “Elane
Photography's willingness to offer some services to Willock did not cure its refusal to provide
other services that it offered to the general public.”47
The Court exhaustively examined Elane Photography’s claim that requiring it to
photograph a same-sex commitment ceremony it violated her First Amendment rights to free
speech and free exercise of religion. The court ruled requiring Elane Photography to photograph
same sex weddings did not violate her right not to engage in compelled speech contrary to her
personal beliefs, because (1) NMHRA does not compel Elane Photography to convey the
government’s message or to affirm a belief or to host or accommodate another speaker’s message,
and does not interfere “with Elane Photography’s editorial judgment” when it regulates its “choice
of clients”48; and (2) observers of Elane Photography’s photographs are unlikely to associate those
photographs with either its owner or its employees and assume Elane Photography “sees nothing
wrong with same-sex marriage,” any more than people attending the wedding think the
photographer and the couple getting married share the same views “on issues ranging from the
minor (the color scheme, the hors d'oeuvres) to the decidedly major (the religious service, the
choice of bride or groom).”49 The Court also ruled that NHMRA does not violate Elane
Photography’s free exercise rights, because (1) “the right of free exercise does not relieve an
individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability on the
ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes),”
and (2) NHMRA is a neutral law of general applicability.”50
In Gifford v. McCarthy, Cynthia and Robert Gifford, owners and operators of Liberty
Ridge Farm, LLC, rent portions of their farm to serve as a venue for wedding ceremonies and
receptions, and employ catering, kitchen and wait staff to provide wedding-related services such
as a food and beverages, decoration and set-up services, and flower arrangements.51 When Melisa
McCarthy and Jennifer McCarthy, an engaged same-sex couple, sought to use Liberty Ridge as
the venue for their wedding, Cynthia Gifford stated the farm did not host same-sex marriages.
Alleging the Giffords engaged in unlawful discrimination based on sexual orientation, the
McCarthys filed a complaint with the State Division of Human Rights (SDHR). SDHR
investigated and found that probable cause existed to support the complaint, and an administrative
law judge (“the ALJ”) found that Liberty Farms is a place of public accommodation and that the
Giffords illegally discriminated against the McCarthys on the basis of their sexual orientation. The
ALJ awarded each McCarthy $1,500 in compensatory damages, imposed a fine in the amount of
$10,000, and directed the Giffords to cease and desist from engaging in discriminatory practices.
The Commissioner of Human Rights adopted the ALJ’s finding and recommendations, and the
Giffords initiated proceedings to annul the SDHR’s determination.
The Court determined that Liberty Ridge’s wedding facilities “comfortably” fit within the
definition of a public accommodation and that Cynthia Gifford’s communicated her unwillingness
to allow the McCarthys to marry on the farm upon learning the McCarthys were a same-sex
47
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couple.52 The Court rejected the Giffords’ argument that they denied services to the McCarthys
not because of their sexual orientation, but because they opposed same-sex marriages on the basis
of their religious beliefs. The Court stated: the “act of entering into a same-sex marriage is
‘conduct that is inextricably tied to sexual orientation’ and . . . there is no basis for distinguishing
between discrimination based on sexual orientation and discrimination based on someone's
conduct of publicly committing to a person of the same sex.”53 The Court also rejected the
Giffords’ argument that SDHR’s compelling them to cater same-sex weddings was contrary to
their sincere religious belief that marriage is “between one man and one woman under God” and
therefore violated their religious exercise rights. The Court noted that the First Amendment right
of free exercise does not relieve an individual from complying with a valid and neutral law of
general applicability, “which is not intended to regulate religious conduct or beliefs but which may
incidentally burden the free exercise of religion.”54
V. DOES CREATING A CUSTOMIZED WEDDING CAKE QUALIFY AS EXPRESSION PROTECTED
UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT?
In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas concludes Phillips’ creation of custom wedding
cakes is expressive. 55 Justice Thomas observes that “the Court has recognized a wide array of
conduct that can qualify as expressive, including nude dancing, burning the American flag, flying
an upside-down American flag with a taped-on peace sign, wearing a military uniform, wearing a
black armband, conducting a silent sit-in, refusing to salute the American flag, and flying a plain
red flag.”56 Further, Justice Thomas notes, in determining whether conduct is sufficiently
expressive, the Court asks whether the actor intended the conduct to be communicative and
whether the conduct is reasonably understood by the viewer to be communicative. Once the Court
determines conduct is expressive, Justice Thomas states, “the Constitution limits the government’s
authority to restrict or compel it.57
Justice Thomas then examined factors showing Phillips’ creation of custom wedding cakes
is expression. Phillips considers himself to be an artist. He includes an artist’s paint palette with
a paintbrush and baker’s whisk in the bakery’s logo. He carefully consults with the couple to
ascertain their preferences and the details of the wedding to ensure the cake reflects the couple
who ordered it. He takes exceptional care sketching the cake’s design, choosing the color scheme,
creating the frosting, baking, sculpting and decorating the cake, and delivering the cake to the
reception. Phillips also thinks the wedding cake symbolically announces that “a wedding has
occurred, a marriage has begun, and the couple should be celebrated.” In short, “[Phillips’] use of
52
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his artistic talents to create a well-recognized symbol that celebrates the beginning of a marriage
clearly communicates a message,” thereby qualifying as expressive conduct protected by the
Constitution.58
Justice Thomas also castigates the determination by the Colorado Court of Appeals that
Phillips’ conduct was insufficiently expressive to be protected from state compulsion. The Court
of Appeals found: (1) reasonable observers would not interpret Phillips’ creation of the wedding
cake as an endorsement of same-sex marriage, and (2) Phillips can post a disclaimer stating
Colorado law prohibits him discrimination on the basis or sexual orientation and his creation of a
wedding cake for a same-sex couple does not constitute an endorsement of same-sex marriage.59
The former argument, Justice Thomas states, “would justify any law that compelled protected
speech” and permit public accommodations laws (such as the Massachusetts law prohibiting the
exclusion of parade participants on the basis of their sexual orientation) to modify the speaker’s
message.60 The latter argument, Justice Thomas claims, would “justify any law compelling
speech,” which would permit the government to compel “speakers to affirm in one breath that
which they deny in the next,” and would force speakers to speak when they want to remain silent.61
It appears, then, that a good argument exists that creating a customized wedding cake
qualifies as expression protected under the First Amendment. That conclusion, however, does not
resolve Masterpiece Cakeshop, because there was no limitation placed on Phillips’ artistic
expression. Rather, he elected not to engage in artistic expression when he declined to create a
wedding cake for Craig and Mullins. Further, the only speech Phillips engaged in was his
conversation with the same-sex couple in which he explained that he would not design a wedding
cake for them, because doing so violated his genuinely held religious principles. Phillips can
certainly convey that same message to other same-sex couples, place a sign in his store window
declaring his religious principles prohibit him from designing wedding cakes for same sex couples,
and even place that message in advertisements promoting his bakery. Professor Culhane provides
a telling story about a Philadelphia cheesesteak store which illustrates this point:
Joey Vento, the owner of Geno's Steaks, did not like illegal immigrants--and
especially did not like that the area around his South Philadelphia establishment
58
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had recently become populated by Spanish speakers. So in 2006, he slapped a sign
on the window where orders are placed: “THIS IS AMERICA. WHEN
ORDERING, PLEASE SPEAK ENGLISH.” The case dominated local news in
Philly. Vento's supporters flocked to his business, while those who were outraged
at what they saw as thinly veiled racism queued up right across the street at Pat's
King of Steaks, Geno's legendary competitor. Vento was hauled before the
Philadelphia Commission on Human Relations, and charged with discrimination
against non-English speakers. He argued that he was expressing a political point
of view, not discriminating. And he prevailed, because no witnesses could establish
that Geno's Steaks actually refused service to anyone who did not speak English.
In sum, the Commission vindicated Vento's argument that he was making a
protected political statement, however crude and nasty.62
In short, there is no First Amendment infringement on Phillips’ artistic expression.
Phillips, like Joey Vento, can freely express his views on same-sex marriage, and as an artist he
may continue to create and design artistic wedding cakes without interference in his artistic
expression. Further, because the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Colorado
Supreme Court and invalidated the Commission’s order, Phillips is now free to refuse to sell
wedding cakes to same-sex couples.63
VI. DOES REQUIRING PHILLIPS TO SELL WEDDING CAKES TO SAME-SEX COUPLES
CONSTITUTE COMPELLED SPEECH?
In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas emphasizes that Phillips’ refusal to sell wedding
cakes to same-sex couples stems from his religious faith, which forbids him from celebrating or
bearing witness to same-sex marriage.64 Further, Justice Thomas noted, Phillips follows his
religious faith in operating his bakery.
Phillips routinely sacrifices profits to ensure that Masterpiece operates in a way that
represents his Christian faith. He is not open on Sundays, he pays his employees a
higher-than-average wage, and he loans them money in times of need. Phillips also
refuses to bake cakes containing alcohol, cakes with racist or homophobic
messages, cakes criticizing God, and cakes celebrating Halloween—even though
Halloween is one of the most lucrative seasons for bakeries.65
Moreover, Justice Thomas explains, Colorado’s justification for requiring Phillips to create
customized cakes for same-sex couples – preventing Phillips from denigrating the dignity of same
sex couples and subjecting same-sex couples to humiliation, frustration and embarrassment – as
“completely foreign to our free-speech jurisprudence.” “States cannot,” Justice Thomas says,
“punish protected speech because some group finds it offensive, hurtful, stigmatic, unreasonable,
or undignified,” because doing so “amounts to nothing less than a proposal to limit speech in the
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service of orthodox expression.”66 Such an objective is anathema to free speech. Indeed, Justice
Thomas observes, Phillips told Craig and Mullins that he would make them birthday cakes, cookies
and brownies but just did not make cakes for same-sex weddings. Justice Thomas said it was
difficult to see how that statement “stigmatizes gays and lesbians more than blocking them from
marching in a city parade, dismissing them from the Boy Scouts, or subjecting them to signs that
say “God Hates Fags”—all of which this Court has deemed protected by the First Amendment.”67
Further, Justice Thomas states, worries about “dignity” and “stigma” did not carry the day when
this Court affirmed the right of white supremacists to burn a 25–foot cross, conduct a rally on
Martin Luther King Jr.’s birthday, or circulate a film featuring hooded Klan members brandishing
weapons and threatening to “bury the niggers.”68
Hence, according to Justice Thomas, because Phillips’s creation of customized wedding
cakes is expression and because Phillips religious beliefs required him to refuse to make
customized wedding cakes for same-sex couples, the Commission’s order directing Phillips to
create customized wedding cakes for same-sex couples requires him to engage in expression with
which he does not wish to be associated. More particularly, forcing Phillips to create customized
wedding cakes for same-sex couples “requires him to, at the very least, acknowledge that samesex weddings are ‘weddings’ and suggest that they should be celebrated – the precise message he
believes his faith forbids.”69 Hence, the Commission likely violated Phillips’ right not to be
compelled to engage in speech.
One commentator disagrees that requiring Phillips to create wedding cakes for same-sex
marriages is compelled speech.70 He notes that “creating wedding cakes, even expensive, unique
cakes is not necessarily expressive conduct,” because wedding cakes are not a traditionally
recognized expressive medium and cannot be said to provide a particularized message.71
Furthermore, Phillips’ equation of his artistic cake making with painting and sculpting, as
suggested by his bakery’s name, decorations and logo, is insufficient to warrant the extension of
protections traditionally accorded artists. Otherwise, branding oneself as an artist would be enough
to elevate “any craftsperson or artisan or Subway employee” to protected status and permit the
self-proclaimed artist to deny service to customers on First Amendment grounds. 72 The
commentator concedes, however, that if the cake is “designed to bear a ‘particularized message,’
it may qualify as speech.” He indicates, for example, if Craig and Mullins had asked Phillips to
make them a tiered rainbow cake for their reception, the cake might qualify for First Amendment
protection, because the rainbow is the widely recognized symbol of LGBT rights movement and
would be recognized by observers as expressive speech.73
While the commentator’s perspective is thought-provoking, it misses the mark. To begin
with, Phillips is unequivocally deemed to be an expert designer of wedding cakes and has built his
business on that reputation. Secondly, the fact that Phillips did not discuss the design of the
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wedding cake with Craig and Mullins does not eradicate the fact that Phillips himself believes
creating wedding cakes for same-sex couples sends messages which were contrary to his genuinely
held religious beliefs and with which he did not want to be associated, namely that same-sex
weddings are weddings and that same-sex weddings should be celebrated. Hence, it appears
compelling Phillips to create wedding cakes for same-sex couples constitutes compelled speech.74
VII. CAN PHILLIPS REFUSE TO CREATE WEDDING CAKES FOR SAME-SEX COUPLES UNDER
THE FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION AGAINST COMPELLED SPEECH?
The U.S. Supreme Court has considered compelled speech in four major decisions.75 In
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, the Court considered the constitutionality of
the Board of Education’s resolution “ordering the salute to the flag become ‘regular part of the
program of activities in the public schools,’ that all teachers and pupils ‘shall be required to
participate in the salute honoring the Nation represented by the Flag.’ ” 76 A student’s failure to
participate in the salute to the flag was deemed to be “insubordination” punished by expulsion
from school. Readmission to school was denied until the expelled student complied, and absence
from school during the expulsion period was considered to be an unlawful absence and grounds
for declaring the student delinquent. The student’s parents were liable for prosecution and, if
convicted, subject to fines not exceeding $50 and a jail term not exceeding thirty days.77
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Students who were Jehovah’s Witnesses and refused to salute the flag were expelled from
school and threatened with being sent to reformatories for juvenile delinquents, and their parents
were prosecuted or threatened with prosecution.78 Plaintiffs brought suit in federal district court
seeking an injunction restraining enforcement of compulsory participation in the salute the flag
against Jehovah’s Witnesses, whose religious beliefs prohibit them from saluting the flag.79 A
three judge panel granted an injunction prohibiting the enforcement of the salute the flag mandate
against the plaintiffs and all other members of the Jehovah’s Witnesses.
The Board of Education appealed directly to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court observed
that forcing students to participate in the salute to the flag compels them to declare and affirm a
belief in what the flag symbolizes and to “communicate by word and sign his acceptance of the
political ideas [the flag represents].”80 Nor does the improper compulsion to participate in the
salute the flag depend on the religious beliefs of the person objecting or the sincerity with which
those beliefs are held, because “[w]hile religion supplies appellees’ motive for enduring the
discomforts of making the issue in this case, many citizens who do not share these religious views
hold such a compulsory rite to infringe constitutional liberty of the individual.”81 Furthermore,
while infringements of speech may be constitutional “to prevent grave and immediate danger to
interests which the state may lawfully protect,” the students’ refusal to participate in the salute to
the flag is “harmless to others.”82 Affirming the district court’s issuance of the injunction
prohibiting the enforcement of the regulation mandating participation in the salute to the flag, the
Court famously declared:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high
or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or
other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein. If there are any circumstances which permit an exception, they do not now
occur to us.83
Similarly, in Wooley v. Maynard, George Maynard, a resident of New Hampshire and a
follower of the Jehovah’s Witnesses faith, covered up the words “Live Free or Die” on his
passenger vehicle license plate, because that motto was repugnant to his faith. Mr. Maynard was
issued three citations for violating a New Hampshire statute making it a misdemeanor to obscure
the figures or letters on any license plate. He was convicted on all three citations, but refused to
pay the fines imposed by the district court.84 Mr. Maynard filed an action in federal district court
seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. In his affidavit filed with the District Court, Mr. Maynard
stated: “I refuse to be coerced by the State into advertising a slogan which I find morally, ethically,
religiously and politically abhorrent.”85 The District Court issued an injunction enjoining New
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Hampshire from arresting and prosecuting the Maynards for covering up that portion of their
license plate containing the words “Live Free or Die.”86
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court noted: “New Hampshire’s statute in effect requires that
[the Maynards] use their private property as a ‘mobile billboard’ for the State’s ideological
message or suffer a penalty,” contrary to the First Amendment, which “protects the right of
individuals to hold a point of view different from the majority and to refuse to foster, in the way
New Hampshire commands, an idea they find morally objectionable.”87 The Court also
determined that the two interests advanced by New Hampshire were not sufficiently compelling
to justify the mandate to display the state motto on the Maynards’ license plate. The first – that
police officers can more readily determine whether passenger cars are carrying the proper license
because the motto appears only on passenger car licenses – was belied by the fact that passenger
car licenses consist of a specific configuration of letters and numbers, making the passenger
licenses readily identifiable. The second – the state’s desire to promote an appreciation of history,
state pride, and individualism – was insufficient, because it was not ideologically neutral and did
not outweigh “an individual’s First Amendment right to avoid becoming the courier for such
message.”88 The Court concluded “the State of New Hampshire may not require appellees to
display the state motto upon their vehicle license plates,” and affirmed the judgment of the District
Court.89
In Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston,90 the U.S. Supreme
Court ruled that the South Boston Allied War Veterans Council (“the Veterans Council”), an
unincorporated association of individuals elected from various South Boston veterans groups
which annually organizes and conducts Boston’s St. Patrick’s-Evacuation Day Parade (“the
Parade”), could not be compelled by the government to allow the Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group
of Boston (“GLIB”), a social organization of persons who are homosexual or bisexual and their
supporters, to march in the parade.91 The Court initially determined that the Parade was expression
for purposes of the First Amendment. It was a festive event in which people in costumes and
uniforms, marching bands and floats, and colorful flags and banners entertained the spectators
lining the streets and the television viewers in their homes.92 While conceding the Veterans
Council was rather lenient in admitting diverse groups with a wide range of messages to its parade,
relaxed admissions requirements did not forfeit the parade organizers’ constitutional protections.93
Rather, the Court noted, the First Amendment protects the parade organizers’ rights to assemble a
multifaceted message of their own choosing, much the same way the First Amendment protects
cable operators’ selection of programs to be rebroadcast and newspaper editors’ assembly of
diverse voices on the editorial page.94
Because GLIB was formed for the very purpose of marching in and communicating its
ideas as part of the Parade,95 the state court’s application of the public accommodations act

86

Id. at 709.
Id. at 715.
88
Id. at 716-17.
89
Id. at 717.
90
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
91
Id. at 560-61, 580-81.
92
Id. at 568-69.
93
Id. at 569-70.
94
Id. at 570.
95
Id.
87

produced an order essentially requiring petitioners to alter the expressive content of their parade.96
Such compelled speech violates the fundamental autonomy given to the speakers under the First
Amendment to choose the content of their own message.97 The Court continued:
Indeed, this general rule, that the speaker has the right to tailor the speech, applies
not only to expressions of value, opinion, or endorsement, but equally to statements
of fact the speaker would rather avoid, subject, perhaps, to the permissive law of
defamation. Nor is the rule’s benefit restricted to the press, being enjoyed by
business corporations generally and by ordinary people engaged in unsophisticated
expression as well as by professional publishers. Its point is simply the point of all
speech protection, which is to shield just those choices of content that in someone’s
eyes are misguided, or even hurtful.98
In Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court
considered the constitutionality of the Solomon Amendment,99 which was enacted by Congress in
response to law schools’ “restricting the access of military recruiters to their students because of
disagreement with the Government’s policy on homosexuals in the military.”100 The Solomon
Amendment provided that, “if any part of an institution of higher education denies military
recruiters access equal to that provided other recruiters, the entire institution would lose certain
federal funds.” The Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc. (“FAIR”), an association
of law schools and law faculties, adopted a policy opposing discrimination based a number of
factors including sexual orientation. FAIR members sought to prevent military from recruiting on
their campuses, because they objected to a policy, subsequently repealed, prohibiting a person
from serving in the Armed Forces “if he has engaged in homosexual acts, stated that he is a
homosexual, or married a person of the same sex.”101 Arguing that “the forced inclusion and equal
treatment of military recruiters violated the law schools’ First Amendment freedoms of speech and
association,” FAIR initiated an action in federal district court seeking an injunction against
enforcement of the Solomon Amendment.102 The district court determined that recruiting is
conduct and not speech and that Congress could regulate the expressive aspect of the conduct
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under the test set forth in United States v. O’Brien,103 and denied the preliminary injunction.104
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court and remanded for the district court
to enter a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the Solomon Amendment. The U.S.
Supreme Court granted certiorari.105
The U.S. Supreme Court determined that the Solomon Amendment did not infringe on
FAIR’s First Amendment right to engage in speech or not to be associated with speech with which
it disagreed. The Court noted that the Solomon Amendment “neither limits what law schools may
say nor requires them to say anything” and that law schools “remain free under the statute to
express whatever views they may have on the military's congressionally mandated employment
policy, all the while retaining eligibility for federal funds.”106 While the Court conceded that the
law schools provide assistance to the military recruiters and that assistance involved elements of
speech, such as e-mails or posted notices on bulletin boards, that assistance was “a far cry” from
mandatory salute the flag exercises in Barnette107 and the “live free or die” motto in Wooley.108
Indeed, the Court noted, accommodating the military’s recruiting message “does not affect the law
school’s speech, because the law schools are not speaking when they host interviews and recruiting
receptions.” Allowing military on campus and providing them with recruiting services are not
inherently expressive, do not suggest law schools agree with the recruiters’ expression, and do not
restrict what law schools may say about military policies.109 Likewise, allowing the military to
recruit at law schools does not “associate” the law school with anything the recruiters might
express and does not force a law school to accept members it does not want. Recruiters are
“outsiders who come onto campus for the limited purpose of trying to hire students—not to become
members of the school's expressive association.” Moreover, students and faculty “are free to
associate to voice their disapproval of the military's message,” and “nothing about the [Solomon
Amendment] affects the composition of the group by making group membership less desirable.”110
Reversing the Third Circuit, the Court concluded:
In United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), defendant, David O’Brien, was tried and convicted of burning
his selective service registration certificate contrary to Section 12(b)(3) of the Universal Military Training and
Service Act of 1948, which prohibits the forging, alteration, destruction, and mutilation of a selective service card.
Id. at 370-71. On appeal, the First Circuit Court of Appeals decided Section 12(b)(3) was an unconstitutional
abridgment of O’Brien’s First Amendment rights. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed. The Court rejected O’Brien’s
argument that destruction of his selective service registration card was protected “symbolic speech” protected by the
First Amendment. Id. at 373. The Court also ruled that, even if the Court assumed the card’s destruction was a
combination of speech and nonspeech elements, the government interest advanced by Section 12(b)(3) outweighed
any incidental restriction on speech. Id. at 376. More particularly, the issuance of the draft certificates showing the
registration and eligibility of individuals to serve in the military was a legitimate and substantial means of promoting
“the constitutional power of Congress to raise and support armies and to make all laws necessary and proper to that
end,” and Section 12(b)(3) is an appropriately narrow means of protecting that interest. Id. at 377, 382. The test
developed by the Court for resolving such disputes is as follows: “a government regulation is sufficiently justified if
it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.”
Id. at 377.
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To the extent that the Solomon Amendment incidentally affects expression, the law
schools' effort to cast themselves as just like the school children in Barnette, the
parade organizers in Hurley, and the Boy Scouts in Dale plainly overstates the
expressive nature of their activity and the impact of the Solomon Amendment on
it, while exaggerating the reach of our First Amendment precedents.111
Neither Hurley nor FAIR supports the proposition compelling Phillips to create wedding
cakes for same-sex marriages triggers unconstitutional compelled speech. To begin with, the
111

Id. at 70. Dale is a freedom from compelled association case. In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640
(2000), the U.S. Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the expulsion of James Dale from the Boy Scouts
because he was homosexual. Active in scouting from ages eight to eighteen, Dale applied for adult membership as
an Assistant Scout Master of Troup 73. His membership was approved around the time he left home to attend
Rutgers University. At Rutgers, he became active in the Lesbian/Gay Alliance, advocated increasing gay role
models for homosexual teenagers, and was identified in a newspaper article as the copresident of the Lesbian/Gay
Alliance. Id. at 644. The Monmouth Boy Scout Council revoked his adult membership, because Boy Scouts policy
denied membership to homosexuals. Id. at 644-45. Dale filed a complaint against the Boy Scouts in the New Jersey
Superior Court, alleging his expulsion violated New Jersey’s public accommodations law, which prohibited
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Id. at 645. The New Jersey Superior Court ruled that the Boy
Scouts was not a place of public accommodation, but rather was a “distinctly private group exempted from coverage
under New Jersey’s law, and that the Boy Scouts’ policy of not admitting homosexuals was protected by the First
Amendment freedom of expressive association.” Id. The New Jersey Superior Court’s Appellate Division reversed,
holding that the public accommodations law applied to the Boy Scouts and was violated by the expulsion of Dale.
Id. at 646. The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed, deciding that the Boy Scouts was a public accommodation and
that, because the membership of the Boy Scouts was large and nonselective and inclusive rather than exclusive, and
because the organization’s practice was to invite or allow nonmembers to attend meetings, the membership of the
Boy Scouts was not sufficiently personal or private to warrant First Amendment protection under the freedom of
intimate association. Id. The New Jersey Supreme Court also said that it was not persuaded the Boy Scouts
associate “in order to preserve the view that homosexuality is immoral” and that Dale’s membership “does not
violate the Boy Scouts’ right of expressive association because his inclusion would not ‘affect in any significant way
[the Boy Scouts'] existing members' ability to carry out their various purposes.’ ” Id. at 647. The New Jersey
Supreme Court concluded that Hurley does “not require deciding the case in favor of the Boy Scouts because the
reinstatement of Dale does not compel Boy Scouts to express any message.” Id. The U.S. Supreme Court
preliminarily laid the foundation of its freedom of association analysis by focusing on the Boy Scouts’ mission
statement - “It is the mission of the Boy Scouts of America to serve others by helping to instill values in young
people and, in other ways, to prepare them to make ethical choices over their lifetime in achieving their full
potential,” id. at 649 - the Scout Oath - “On my honor I will do my best to do my duty to God and country and
obey the Scout Law; To help other people at all times; To keep myself physically strong, mentally awake, and
morally straight,” id. - and the Scout Law - “A Scout is: Trustworthy, Obedient, Helpful, Thrifty, Friendly, Brave,
Clean, Kind, Reverent,” id. - all of which, the Court emphasized, underscored the core purpose of the Boy Scouts to
instill a system of values and moral beliefs through engagement in expressive activity, id. at 649-650. Further, the
Boy Scouts claimed “it does not want to promote homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior” and teaches
homosexual behavior is not “morally straight,” id. at 651, and its position statement maintained: “The Boy Scouts of
America is a private, membership organization and leadership therein is a privilege and not a right. We do not
believe that homosexuality and leadership in Scouting are appropriate.” Id. at 652. Admitting Dale to adult
membership in the Boy Scouts as an assistant scoutmaster, the Court noted, “would, at the very least, force the
organization to send a message, both to the youth members and the world, that the Boy Scouts accepts homosexual
conduct as a legitimate form of behavior.” Id. at 653. Relying on Hurley, the Court stated that the case must be
resolved by balancing “the associational interest in freedom of expression” with the state’s interest in eliminating
discrimination through its public accommodations law. Id. at 658-59. Concluding the “state interests embodied in
New Jersey’s public accommodations law do not justify such a severe intrusion on the Boy Scout’s right to freedom
of expressive association,” the Court held “the First Amendment prohibits the State from imposing such a
requirement through the application of its public accommodations law” and reversed the judgment of the New
Jersey Supreme Court. Id. at 659, 661.

expression in Hurley was the annual parade which takes place on March 17 and combines two
celebrations: St. Patrick’s Day and, since as early as 1737, the evacuation of royal troops and
Loyalists from the City of Boston.112 The Veterans Council selects the organizations whose
members participate in the parade, and, as noted above, declined to approve GLIB’s participation
in the parade.113 While each organization selected to participate in the Parade identifies itself and
shapes and conveys its own message as a parade participant, the Council decides what message is
included (and celebrated) in the Parade.114 As the Court noted:
Rather like a composer, the Council selects the expressive units of the parade from
potential participants, and though the score may not produce a particularized
message, each contingent's expression in the Council's eyes comports with what
merits celebration on that day. Even if this view gives the Council credit for a more
considered judgment than it actively made, the Council clearly decided to exclude
a message it did not like from the communication it chose to make, and that is
enough to invoke its right as a private speaker to shape its expression by speaking
on one subject while remaining silent on another.115
The Hurley expression differs from the Masterpiece expression, because the assembly of
the expression in a parade is different from the assembly of expression on a wedding cake. The
former involves the assembly of disparate groups in a parade to form a message. The latter
involves the expression of a single baker opposed to same-sex marriage because his fundamental
religious beliefs.
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the Court determined that Massachusetts public
accommodation law was “peculiarly applied” when it mandated the inclusion of GLIB in the
Parade.116 “There is no dispute,” the Court noted, “about the participation of openly gay, lesbian,
or bisexual individuals in various units admitted to the parade. [The Veterans Council] disclaim[s]
any intent to exclude homosexuals as such, and no individual member of GLIB claims to have
been excluded from parading as a member of any group that the Council has approved to
march.”117 Hence Massachusetts public accommodations law was applied, not to prevent
discrimination against individuals denied access to a place of public accommodation, but to alter
the message the Veterans Council wished to convey in its parade. The court explained:
Since every participating unit affects the message conveyed by the private
organizers, the state courts' application of the statute produced an order essentially
requiring petitioners to alter the expressive content of their parade. Although the
state courts spoke of the parade as a place of public accommodation . . . once the
expressive character of both the parade and the marching GLIB contingent is
understood, it becomes apparent that the state courts' application of the statute had
the effect of declaring the sponsors’ speech itself to be the public accommodation.
Under this approach any contingent of protected individuals with a message would
have the right to participate in petitioners’ speech, so that the communication
112
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produced by the private organizers would be shaped by all those protected by the
law who wished to join in with some expressive demonstration of their own. But
this use of the State's power violates the fundamental rule of protection under the
First Amendment, that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of his own
message.118
In short, public accommodations laws cannot be used to gain admission to or alter an
individual’s or an organization’s speech, because the speech itself, rather than individuals
discriminated against, becomes subject to accommodation. In contrast, when Colorado orders
Phillips to create wedding cakes for same-sex couples, Colorado does not change Phillips’ speech
or alter his message that he opposes same-sex marriage because it is contrary to his religious
principles. Hence Hurley does not support Phillips’ claim of compelled speech.119
Likewise, FAIR does not support the contention that Colorado’s accommodation law
compels Phillips to engage in speech, because allowing military recruiters on campus is not
inherently expressive and does not associate the law school with anything the recruiters might say.
In contrast, as noted above, Phillips creation of wedding cakes arguably is expressive conduct.
Moreover, Phillips has garnered a reputation for creating artistic wedding cakes, which are eagerly
sought by his customers and whose authorship is recognized by the wedding guests and enforced
by his routine participation and direction in the cake cutting part of the wedding celebration.
Hence, unlike FAIR, the elements of expressive conduct and association are present in Masterpiece
Cakeshop.
In contrast to Hurley and FAIR, however, compelling Phillips to create wedding cakes for
same-sex marriages seems to fall within the purview of Barnette and Woolley, both of which
involved compelled speech contrary to sincerely held religious beliefs.120 As noted above, creating
wedding cakes can safely qualify as protected expression, and, like the school students forced to
participate in the salute the flag and the New Hampshire residents forced to carry the state’s motto
on their license plate, Phillips objects to the creation of wedding cakes for same-sex couples,
because designing the wedding cakes is compelled expressive conduct which conflicts with his
religious beliefs. Hence Phillips has a good argument that Colorado’s public accommodating law
mandating his creation and sale of wedding cakes to same-sex couples violates the First
Amendment protection against compelled speech. Notably, however, a significant difference
exists between Barnette and Wooley and the situation confronting Phillips. In both Barnette and
Wooley the state’s interest in compelling speech contrary to genuinely held religious beliefs was
weak. That, as is more fully discussed in Part IX, cannot be said about the interest advanced by
the state’s public accommodation law in Masterpiece Cakeshop, namely eliminating
discrimination against protected classes in the sales of goods and services.121
118
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Supreme Court ruled requiring Elane Photography to photograph same sex weddings did not violate her right not to
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VIII. CAN PHILLIPS REFUSE TO CREATE WEDDING CAKES FOR SAME-SEX COUPLES UNDER
THE EXERCISE OF RELIGION CLAUSE?
This is a difficult question to answer, because it places two fundamental rights – the right
to be free of discrimination in the purchase of goods and services and the right to exercise religion
– in opposition to each other. Most U.S. Supreme Court decisions have considered the
constitutionality of statutes which effected infringements on the exercise of religion, and, at first
blush, it seems that Masterpiece Cakeshop is the opposite, because it deals with an accommodation
law which seeks to protect individuals against discrimination. Nonetheless, despite its laudable
intentions, the Colorado public accommodation law is a government statute which triggers
infringement on the baker’s religious exercise rights and hence must pass constitutional muster.
Prior to 1990, the U.S. Supreme Court resolved cases which challenged legislation on the
grounds it infringed on the party’s religious exercise rights by examining whether the infringement
advanced a compelling interest of sufficient magnitude to override the interest claiming Free
Exercise Clause protection. In Sherbert v. Verner, Adell Sherbert, a member of the Seventh-day
Adventist Church was fired from her job, because she would not work on Saturday, the Sabbath
Day of her religion.122 Ms. Sherbert’s application for unemployment benefits was denied by the
Employment Security Commission on the grounds her refusal to work on Saturdays disqualified
her under a provision of the unemployment law that required her to accept suitable work when
offered. The Commission’s finding was sustained by the Court of Common Pleas, and, upon
appeal, affirmed by the South Carolina Supreme Court, which rejected her claim that the
unemployment compensation law as applied to her abridged her rights under the Free Exercise
Clause.123 In reversing that ruling, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that the South Carolina Supreme
Court decision cannot succeed against an Exercise of Religion claim unless there was no
infringement on her free exercise rights or because the burden on her free exercise right is justified
by a compelling state interest.124 Significantly, a South Carolina statute provided that, when textile
plants are authorized to operate on Sundays, no employee who is conscientiously opposed to
Sunday work can be compelled to work on Sunday. Hence, “South Carolina expressly saves the
Sunday worshipper from having to make the kind of choice which . . . infringes the Sabbatarian’s
religious liberty.”125 Moreover, South Carolina failed to demonstrate a compelling justification
for infringing on Ms. Sherbert’s religious exercise. South Carolina claimed before the U.S.
Supreme Court that permitting her to collect unemployment benefits might trigger specious
unemployment benefit claims or dilute the unemployment compensation fund. Those interests,
however, were not raised before the South Carolina Supreme Court, and, even if they were, there
was no evidence those concerns warranted a substantial infringement of religious liberties.126
In Wisconsin v. Yoder, parents who were members of the Amish religion and Mennonite
Church challenged a Wisconsin statute that required children to attend public or private school
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until reaching age 16.127 The parents insisted that requiring their children to attend school beyond
completion of eighth grade was contrary to their Amish religious beliefs and way of life, because
doing so would expose them and their children to the censure of the church community, endanger
their own and their children’s salvation, and threaten the survival of the Amish community.128 The
parents were charged, tried, and convicted of violating the compulsory school attendance law and
fined the sum of $5 each.129 The Wisconsin Circuit Court affirmed the convictions, but the
Wisconsin Supreme Court sustained respondent’s claim under the Free Exercise Clause and
reversed the convictions, determining that the State failed to demonstrate its interest in establishing
and maintaining an educational system overrides the parents’ free exercise of their religion.130 The
U.S. Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that, in order for Wisconsin to compel Amish students to
attend school beyond the eighth grade contrary to their religious beliefs, Wisconsin must
demonstrate there is no interference with the free exercise of religious or “there is a state interest
of sufficient magnitude to override the interest claiming protection under the Free Exercise
Clause.”131 The Court determined that the Amish parents demonstrated convincingly that
accommodating their religious objections by not compelling one or at the most two years of
education will not impair the physical or mental health of their children or their ability to become
self-supporting and responsible citizens, and that the State failed to demonstrate with particularity
how its interest in compulsory education would be adversely affected by granting and exemption
to the Amish.132
The U.S. Supreme Court reached a similar decision in Thomas v. Review Board of Indiana
Employment Section Division.133 Eddie Thomas, a Jehovah’s Witness, worked for several years
in the roll foundry in the Blaw-Knox Foundry, which fabricated steel for a variety of industrial
uses. The roll foundry closed, and Blaw-Knox transferred him to the department that fabricated
turrets for military tanks. On his first day on the job, Thomas realized his work was weapons
related. He confirmed that all of the other departments in which there were openings engaged in
the same work. Unable to transfer to another department and claiming his participation in the
manufacture of military weaponry was contrary to his religious beliefs, he quit his job and applied
for unemployment benefits. His application for unemployment benefits was denied. That decision
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was reversed by the Indiana Court of Appeals, but sustained on appeal to the Supreme Court of
Indiana, which determined that “it was unclear what his belief was, and what the religious basis of
his belief was” and that “another Jehovah’s Witness had no scruples about working on tank
Turrets.”134 Deciding the denial of unemployment benefits to Thomas violated his right to free
exercise of religion, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Supreme Court of Indiana. 135 The U.S.
Supreme Court ruled that it was not within judicial purview to evaluate whether the employee
“correctly perceived the commands of their common faith.”136 Rather, the narrow function of the
reviewing court was to determine whether the worker “terminated his work because of an honest
conviction that such work was forbidden by his religion.”137 Furthermore the interest advanced
by Indiana for denying unemployment benefits – that widespread unemployment would result –
was not supported by evidence and did not constitute a sufficiently compelling reason to infringe
on Thomas’ free exercise right.138
In 1990, the test of “whether the challenged action imposed a substantial burden on the
practice of religion, and, if it did, whether it was needed to serve a compelling government
interest,”139 was upended by the U.S. Supreme Court in Employment Division, Department of
Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith.140 In Smith, two members of the Native American Church
sought unemployment benefits from the State of Oregon after they were fired from their jobs for
ingesting peyote for sacramental purposes. The State of Oregon denied the benefits, because
consuming peyote was a crime; the Oregon Supreme Court, applying the compelling interest
balancing test, ruled the denial of benefits violated the Free Exercise Clause.141 Noting that
“conscientious scruples have not, in the course of the long struggle for religious toleration, relieved
the individual from obedience to a general law not aimed at the promotion or restriction of religious
beliefs,”142 the U.S. Supreme Court reversed, ruling the compelling interest balancing test “would
open the prospect of constitutionally required religious exemptions from civic obligations of
almost every conceivable kind,” because every regulation of conduct as applied to a religious
objector was presumed to be invalid, and the protection of religious liberty does not require such
a result.143 Rather, the right of free exercise of religion does not exempt an individual from the
obligation to comply with a “valid and neutral law of general applicability” simply because the
law mandates conduct contrary to the individual’s religious beliefs.144 Hence, because the
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ingestion of peyote was prohibited under Oregon law and that law was a valid and neutral law of
general applicability and therefore consistent with the Free Exercise Clause, the denial of
unemployment compensation was permissible under the First Amendment.145
Constitutional protection of religious exercise is not provided, however, when the statute
is not a neutral law of general applicability. In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah, the U.S. Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of ordinances passed by the City
of Hialeah prohibiting the unnecessary or cruel killing of animals. The ordinances were passed in
response to the announcement of Ernesto Pichardo, the president and priest of the Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. (the Church”), whose congregants practice the Santeria religion, that the
Church leased land in the City of Hialeah on which it planned to erect a church, school, cultural
center and museum. Pichardo also proclaimed that the Church would bring into the open the
practice of the Santeria faith, which included ritual animal sacrifice “performed at birth, marriage,
and death rites, for the cure of the sick, for the initiation of new members and priests, and during
an annual celebration”146 Claiming that the ordinance violated their rights under the Free Exercise
Clause, the Church and Pichardo filed an action for declaratory judgment against the City of
Hialeah.
The District Court found there were four compelling reasons supporting the enactment of
the ordinance: (1) animal sacrifices present a substantial health risk to the practitioners and the
general public, because the animals to be sacrificed are uninspected and often kept in unsanitary
conditions and animal remains are found in public places; (2) animal sacrifice inflicted emotional
injury to children who witness the sacrifice; (3) the method of killing the animals was unreliable
and inhumane and the animals sacrificed experienced “a great deal of fear and stress”; and (4) the
City had a compelling interest in restricting the slaughter or sacrifice to areas zoned for
slaughterhouse use. Concluding that the compelling interests of the City outweighed the interest
of the Church and its congregants in the free exercise of religion, the District Court ruled in favor
145
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of the City of Hialeah.147 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in a one-paragraph per
curiam opinion, which stated the ordinance was consistent with the Constitution and noted the
District Court applied a standard which was stricter than the standard applied in Smith.148
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, deciding the objective of the ordinances was “the
suppression of the central element of the Santeria worship service,”149 because:
[T]he ordinances by their own terms target this religious exercise; the texts of the
ordinances were gerrymandered with care to proscribe religious killings of animals
but to exclude almost all secular killings; and the ordinances suppress much more
religious conduct than is necessary in order to achieve the legitimate ends asserted
in their defense. These ordinances are not neutral, and the court below committed
clear error in failing to reach this conclusion.150
The Court also decided the ordinances “fall well below” the minimum standards of
“general applicability,” because the ordinances are underinclusive with respect the killing of
animals except those occasioned by religious sacrifice, underinclusive with respect to the city’s
interest in public health by failing to address the killing and disposal of animals by hunters and the
disposal of animal remains in restaurants’ garbage, and underinclusive because of the exemption
provided for the slaughter or processing for sale of small numbers of hogs and cattle per week.151
Because the ordinances were neither neutral nor of general application, strict scrutiny applied.152
Since the ordinances were “underinclusive to a substantial extent” to the interests advanced by the
City of Haileah and “only conduct motivated by religious conviction . . . bears the weight of the
government restrictions,” the ordinances failed to meet the strict scrutiny standard and were
unconstitutional and void.”153
It would appear, then, that Phillips cannot refuse to create wedding cakes for same-sex
couples on the grounds doing so violates his rights under Exercise of Religion Clause. Restrictions
on religious exercise rights no longer have to be supported by a compelling government interest to
pass constitutional muster, and the operative presumption employed in Sherbert, Yoder and
Thomas that the constitutional protection of religion exercise rights invariably prevails has been
terminated by Smith. Further, because Colorado’s public accommodation law appears to be a
“valid and neutral law of general applicability,”154 its constitutionality under the Exercise of
Religion Clause is determined by Smith, and unintended and incidental infringement on the
religious freedom of Phillips does not make the accommodation laws unconstitutional. Notably
this conclusion is supported by the decisions of the Washington Supreme Court in Arlene’s
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Flowers,155 the New Mexico Supreme Court in Elane Photography,156 and the New York
Appellate division in Giffords,157 all of which determined that, because their respective public
accommodation laws were valid and neutral laws of general applicability, mandating the sale of
floral arrangements, the photographing of a commitment ceremony, and the rental of a reception
venue did not constitute compelled speech contrary to the florist’s, photographer’s, or the caterer’s
religious views. Hence, it is unlikely Phillips can refuse to create and sell wedding cakes to samesex couples on the grounds of the Free Exercise Clause.158
This conclusion is supported by an essay entitled “Contemplating Masterpiece Cakeshop,”
authored by Professors Terri Day and Danielle Weatherby, in which they note that “[o]pponents
of marriage equality are increasingly asserting their own religious beliefs to justify discrimination
against LGBT members in public accommodations.”159 Further, they state, if Phillips and other
business owners are permitted to invoke their exercise of religion rights to refuse to serve LGBT
customers, the government not only acquiesces to discrimination but undermines public
accommodation laws, which “prevent the economic and social balkanization prevalent when
businesses decide to serve only their own kind, and ensures the uninhibited flow of intra- and
interstate commerce.”160 The authors note that both public accommodation laws and the
government protection of free exercise of religion advance an important public purpose:
maintenance of the social order. Indeed, public accommodation laws were enacted for the purpose
of maintaining social order, and First Amendment protection of religious expression has
traditionally been tailored to achieve the same purpose. Hence, while individuals can believe
polygamy is consistent with their religious philosophy, anti-polygamy statutes can curb the
practice of engaging in polygamy in order to preserve social order.161 Likewise, while members
of the Native American Church can believe ingesting peyote in violation of criminal law is a valid
component of their religious practices, the state can deny unemployment benefits to individuals
convicted of violating the law, because religious ceremonies “subversive of good order” cannot
“excuse conduct prescribed by valid criminal law which did not specifically target the religious
practice.”162 If both public accommodation laws and First Amendment protection of the exercise
of religion are to continue to maintain social order, enforcement of accommodation laws must
prevail over the exercise of religion.163
Arlene’s Flowers, 389 P.3d at 568. Arlene’s Flowers is discussed supra at notes 38-44.
Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 73. Elane Photography is discussed supra at notes 45-50.
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Gifford, 137 A.D.3d at 38-39. Gifford is discussed supra at notes 51-54.
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See Velte, supra note 121, at 1154 (“To date, courts that have considered the Antidiscrimination Question have
rejected the [exercise of religion] arguments put forth by the Religious Right. It takes little effort to unmask these
legal arguments for what they are--part of the Religious Right's long-game: to establish “a conservative Christian
social order inspired by religious law. To achieve this goal, they seek to remove religious freedom as an integral
part of religious pluralism and constitutional democracy, and redefine it in Orwellian fashion to justify
discrimination by an ever wider array of ‘religified’ institutions and businesses.”)
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(2017).
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Id. at 97 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (upholding a criminal polygamy law that punished
conduct, rather than belief, that was “in violation of social duties or subversive of good order”)).
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Id. at 98 (citing Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (reaffirming Congress’ power to
regulate criminal conduct that affects interstate commerce and is “subversive of good order”)).
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Similarly, Professor Kyle Velte contends that enforcement of antidiscrimination statutes
does not violate the Free Exercise Clause, because (1) antidiscrimination laws are valid laws which
prohibit conduct the state is free to regulate,164 (2) antidiscrimination laws are not grounded in any
religious ideology, but rather protect residents and visitors from discrimination based on
membership in a protected class,165 (3) antidiscrimination laws “are generally applicable, because
they do not target religiously motivated conduct and do not provide broad opportunities for secular
exemptions,”166 and (4) antidiscrimination claims do not present “hybrid” claims, because any
speech claim fails in discrimination cases thereby eliminating the presentation of independent
constitutional claim.167 Professor Velte also notes that these four reasons comply with the
requirements laid down by the U.S. Supreme Court in Smith for determining whether the
enforcement of a criminal statute violates free exercise rights. 168
IX. DO SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION LAWS TRUMP THE FIRST AMENDMENT
PROTECTION AGAINST COMPELLED SPEECH?
Professor Lawrence G. Sager notes that public accommodation laws are “remarkably
widespread.” They “exist in forty-five states, in the District of Colombia, and in a number of cities,
and all of them “bar discrimination on race, sex, nationality, and religion, and about half bar
discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and/or gender identity.”169 Professor Lucien
Dhooge reports that a “growing number of states, thirty-one in all, prohibit discrimination in
private or public employment or both on the basis of sexual orientation with a smaller number of
states extending protection on the basis of gender identity,” and that twenty-one states and the
District of Columbia “prohibit businesses deemed to be public accommodations from refusing to
serve prospective patrons on the basis of sexual orientation.”170

One of the reasons the Framers discarded the Articles of Confederation and designed a whole new
constitutional framework was to empower a strong federal government to regulate interstate commerce. The
adverse economic effects caused by private discrimination in public accommodations are measurable.
Moreover, state approval of this type of discrimination has substantial, negative effects on interstate
commerce and encroaches on federal powers to regulate interstate commerce. Indeed, states that acquiesce
to discrimination by enabling religious objections like Jack Phillips’ will suffer economic losses as people
and businesses flee to more LGBT-friendly environments, resulting in economic barriers or creating
commercial balkanization. Ultimately, state sanctioned private discrimination in public accommodations
will affect interstate commerce, which raises potential Dormant Commerce Clause concerns.
Id. at 99-100.
164
Kyle C. Velte, Defeating the Religious Rights Challenges to Antidiscrimination Statutes, 49 CONN. L. REV. 1, 49
(2016).
165
Id.
166
Id. at 50.
167
Id. at 50-51.
168
Id. at 49.
169
Lawrence G. Sager, In the Name of God: Structural Injustice and Religious Faith, 60 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 585, 58687 (2016).
170
Lucien J. Dhooge, Public Accommodation Statutes and Sexual Orientation – Should There Be a Religious
Exemption for Secular Businesses?, 21 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 319, 320-21 (2015). Professor Dhooge also
provides an interesting analysis of the statutes’ approach in prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation and defining public accommodations. Id. at 338-39. He also finds the statutes are ”relatively uniform”
in identifying protected classes. He notes:

Professor John Culhane argues that enforcement of sexual orientation discrimination laws
advances an important societal interest that outweighs the right of free expression.171 He notes
that the U.S. Constitution and federal, state and local laws have “enshrined anti-discrimination
imperatives in law” to offer protection to enumerated categories of people, and that “the history of
discrimination against the LGBTQ community has been no less harrowing” than discrimination
suffered by racial minorities, especially African-Americans and Native Americans, women, and
religious minorities.172 Even so, comparatively little protection against discrimination has been
accorded to LGBTQ people. No protection against discrimination is provided by federal law as of
2018, except for a “contested reading of ‘discrimination based on sex’ under the Civil Rights
Act.”173 Further, only “[a]bout half the states, and many localities, offer protections to sexual
minorities (sometimes including the trans-community, but sometimes not).” Hence, “in the rest of
the country, it remains possible to fire a gay employee, reject a lesbian couple's attempt to purchase
a home, and - yes - turn away a gay couple that enters a bakery to buy a wedding cake.” 174 This
permits businesses to inflict “dignitary harm” to LGBTQ people when the businesses deny basic
services for no good reason and, in many places, leaves them to struggle to find a place to serve
them.175 Not enforcing discrimination laws on the grounds of protecting religious expression, he
notes, would “permit a painter [to] invite the public to his gallery at which he painted portraits of
them for a fee but [refuse] to paint black people” and a “musician [to] invite the world to his studio
where he wrote songs about them for a fee but [refuse] to do so for Jews or Muslims.” Surely, he
says, the “First Amendment protects a lot, but not that conduct.”176 LGBTQ people deserve the
same protection. “Where laws offer protection based on sexual identity, their very presence signals
recognition that the state's interest in gathering that class under the anti-discrimination imperative
is compelling,” and “slicing and dicing the categories enumerated in the law, and then to decide
that some of them are less important than others, is to create protection with an asterisk.”177
The First Amendment prohibition against compelled speech protects the interests of
speakers who do not want to be associated with or compelled to declare and affirm a belief they
do not share. More particularly, as noted above, forcing Phillips to create wedding cakes for samesex weddings requires him to acknowledge that same-sex weddings are “weddings” and suggest
that they should be celebrated – the precise message he believes his faith forbids. Protecting
Phillips from compelled speech is an important First Amendment safeguard. Nonetheless,
All of these statutes, with the possible exception of Minnesota, include heterosexuality, homosexuality and
bisexuality within the term “sexual orientation.” These statutes, with the possible exceptions of Delaware
and Vermont, also extend the definition to include perceived orientation of persons by others. However, only
eighteen of these statutes expressly include gender identity or expression. The definitions of gender identity
and expression vary slightly among those statutes extending protection to this group.
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Id. at 251. Professor Culhane’s argument that public accommodation laws must be enforced at the expense of
restricting the right of religious exercise differs sharply from Justice Thomas’ position that enforcement of
accommodation laws improperly compels speech contrary to the First Amendment as discussed supra at note 69.

granting Phillips an exemption from public accommodation laws on the grounds of compelled
speech would allow all businesses to claim their sincerely held religious beliefs, which must be
accepted at face value and are exempt from evaluation or question, exempt them from providing
goods and services to same-sex couples. Preventing the infliction of “dignitary harm” to samesex couples certainly outweighs Phillips’ claim of compelled speech, particularly because he can
take various steps – e.g. placing a sign in his store window informing the public of his religious
convictions178 – to demonstrate his lack of association with the speech he abjures. In short,
enforcement of public accommodation laws outweighs Phillips’ claim of compelled speech. As
noted by Professor Mark Strasser,
The First Amendment right not to speak is less robust than commonly thought,
especially when the State is not prescribing the content of the message at issue.
Further, when the public does not understand the message unless further
explanation is offered, the “message” itself likely does not trigger First Amendment
guarantees. Public accommodation laws are of growing importance because the
Nation seems to be growing increasingly fractured along a variety of fault lines.
This is not the time to gut such laws merely because some individuals have sincere
reservations about providing services for members of disfavored groups. The
claimed right not to speak in these vendor cases has no basis in the First
Amendment as currently understood. Further, recognition of such a right would do
great harm and lead to further tearing of the social fabric, a result that no one should
applaud.179
Hence, it appears that protecting same-sex couples from sexual orientation discrimination by
enforcing public accommodation laws trumps the right of individuals to avoid compelled speech
which conflicts with their genuinely held religious beliefs.180
178

If such a sign were posted, Phillips may not be asked to provide services he would otherwise feel compelled to
refuse. While posting that sign may cause some existing and potential customers to choose another bakery, it is less
deleterious than refraining from baking wedding cakes at all, and pales by comparison to the indignity inflicted on
same-sex couples who are denied goods and services in the marketplace. See Culhane, supra note 62, at 237 (“[T]he
proper balance to strike in cases pitting anti-discrimination imperatives against the freedom of expression allows the
conscientious objector to state his or her view, but not to deny service based on it. Because difficult questions can
arise as to when a statement of belief shades into a coercive (and therefore unacceptable) message, I propose that
legislators create safe-harbor language that would perhaps be written into existing anti-discrimination laws, and that,
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other language to express their beliefs could do so, but at the risk that the language would be interpreted as
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Owners Refuse Service to Same-Sex Couples Due to Religious Beliefs, 40 S. Ill. U. L.J. 301, 318-20 (2016)
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Obergefell, 70 STAN L. REV. 260, 317 (2018):
But the question is not whether religious conflicts between sellers and buyers or employers and employees
are desirable; they are inevitable in a pluralistic society. Rather, the question is: When such conflicts arise,
which side should be allowed to invoke the force of law? The answer that prevents religious fracturing and
allows for pluralistic discourse is that government should avoid supporting parties who seek to exclude
participants from the market on religious grounds and should instead support parties who risk exclusion from

X. Recap
The discussion and analysis provided above supports the following conclusions:
(1) While a good argument exists that Phillips’ creation of customized wedding cake qualifies as
expression protected under the First Amendment, his refusal to create a wedding cake for Craig
and Mullins obviates any infringement on Phillips’ artistic expression.
(2) Compelling Phillips to create wedding cakes for same-sex couples likely constitutes compelled
speech, because doing so forces him to acknowledge same-sex weddings should be celebrated
contrary to his religious beliefs and, because he is a successful and well known baker, he is
associated with the wedding cake.
(3) Phillips has a good argument that Colorado’s public accommodating law mandating his
creation and sale of wedding cakes to same-sex couples violates the First Amendment protection
against compelled speech, provided the interests advanced by protecting his right of expression
outweigh the interests advanced by enforcement of Colorado’s public accommodation law.
(4) Phillips cannot refuse to create wedding cakes for same-sex couples under the Exercise of
Religion Clause, because Colorado’s public accommodation law appears to be a valid and neutral
law of general applicability, and unintended and incidental infringement on the religious freedom
of Phillips does not make the accommodation law unconstitutional.
(5) Because the interests advanced by enforcement of Colorado’s public accommodation law in
protecting same-sex couples from sexual orientation discrimination substantially outweigh the
First Amendment interest advanced in protecting Phillips from compelled speech, Phillips likely
cannot succeed in his compelled speech claim.
XI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In Masterpiece Cakeshop, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of Jack Phillips, a baker
who refused to create a wedding cake for a same-sex couple, because doing so violated his deeply
held religious beliefs. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Colorado Court of
the market--the victims of religious discrimination, not the perpetrators. A constitutional rule providing that
answer is one that will ensure confident pluralism's endurance in the face of ineradicable difference.
Another commentator argues in favor of narrowly tailored exemptions for those individuals who refuse to sell goods
and services on the basis of their sincerely held religious beliefs. See Sarah Jackson, The Unaccommodating Nature
of Accommodations Laws: Why Narrowly Tailored Exemptions to Antidiscrimination Statutes Make for a More
Inclusive Society, 68 ALA. L. REV. 855, 876 (2017):
A narrowly tailored exemption for these objectors, rather than a black and white consideration of permissible
encroachments on rights, could protect the people on both sides of the issue. The Sherbert compelling interest
test is an option for situations in which the competing interests are those of individuals, rather than a state
interest burdening an individual's liberty. In these wedding vendor cases, two individuals are protected by a
state antidiscrimination statute and their opposition is protected under the First Amendment. A narrow
exemption provides an avenue for the states to continue pursuing antidiscrimination ends while still
respecting the religious liberty of individuals.

Appeals upholding the determination of the Colorado Human Rights Commission that the baker’s
refusal violated Colorado’s public accommodations law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation. The U.S. Supreme Court also invalidated the order of the Commission
requiring Phillips to cease and desist his refusal to create cakes for same-sex couples, because the
Commission failed to consider Phillips’s sincere religious objections with requisite neutrality.
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision, like the month of March which comes in like a lion
and leaves like a lamb, failed to live up to the heightened expectations that the decision would be
a blockbuster. Instead, the U.S. Supreme Court sidestepped the chore of reconciling two
fundamental principles: whether the baker’s refusal to create a wedding cake for a same-sex
marriage reception was protected by the First Amendment and whether Colorado has authority to
protect the rights and dignity of gay people who seek to purchase goods and services in the
marketplace. In that sense, the decision is a dud. Neither party prevailed, and Jack Phillips remains
free to refuse to create wedding cakes for same-sex couples. Perhaps it is all for the better. Perhaps
the country simply is not ready for a U.S. Supreme Court decision choosing whether a baker’s
ability to practice his religion freely is more important than the right of a same-sex couple to be
free of discrimination in the purchase of goods and services.
Nonetheless, while those excited about the prospects for a blockbuster decision are likely
disappointed, Masterpiece Cakeshop might have an alternative use: serving as a case study
permitting students to analyze fundamental and clashing principles underlying the case: whether
Phillips’ creation of custom designed wedding cakes is a form of protected speech, whether
requiring Phillips to sell wedding cakes to same-sex couples violates his right not to engage in
compelled speech, whether Phillips can refuse to create a wedding cake for a same-sex couple as
an exercise of religion, and whether denying same-sex couples the right to purchase goods and
services for their wedding can be constitutionally prohibited under state anti-discrimination laws.

